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Section A introduces the formal de…nitions of equilibria in the dynamic communication game. Section B presents all supplementary proofs needed for the main results and contains additional analysis of the communication game, such as selection of equilibria and comparative statics. Section C presents the formal comparison between centralized decisionmaking, once-and-for-all delegation, and time-contingent delegation. Section D discusses the robustness of the results to alternative versions of the model.
A. Communication game: Equilibrium notion
This section presents the formal de…nition of the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies of the dynamic communication game of Section III, as well as the de…nition of a stationary equilibrium for the case = 0. This is a dynamic game with observed actions (messages and the exercise decision) and incomplete information (type of the agent). Heuristically, the timing of events over an in…nitesimal time interval [t; t + dt] prior to option exercise can be described as follows: (1) Nature determines the realization of X t . (2) The agent sends message m (t) 2 M to the principal. ( 3) The principal decides whether to exercise the option or not. If the option is exercised, the principal obtains the payo¤ of X t I, the agent obtains the payo¤ of X t I + b, and the game ends. Otherwise, the game continues, and the nature draws X t+dt = X t + dX t . Because the game ends when the principal exercises the option, we can only consider histories such that the option has not yet been exercised. Then, the history of the game at time t has two components: the sample path of the public state X (t) and the history of messages of the agent: H t = fX (s) ; s t; m (s) ; s < tg.
De…nition A.1. Strategies m = fm t ; t 0g and e = fe t ; t 0g, beliefs , and a message space M constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies (PBEM) if:
1. For every t, H t , 2 , and strategy m, E e r (e ) ( X ( (e )) I + b) jH t ; ; ( jH t ) ; m ; e E e r (e ) ( X ( (e )) I + b) jH t ; ; ( jH t ) ; m; e .
2. For every t, H t , m (t) 2 M , and strategy e, E e r (e ) ( X ( (e )) I) jH t ; ( jH t ; m (t)) ; m ; e E e r (e) ( X ( (e)) I) jH t ; ( jH t ; m (t)) ; m ; e .
3. Bayes' rule is used to update beliefs ( jH t ) to ( jH t ; m (t)) whenever possible: For every H t and m (t) 2 M , if there exists such that m t ( ; H t ) = m (t), then for all
where ( jH 0 ) = 1 1 for 2 and ( jH 0 ) = 0 for 6 2 . 4. For every t, H t , 2 , and m (t) 2 M , m t ( ; H t ) = m ( ; X (t) ; ( jH t )) ; (4) e t (H t ; m (t)) = e (X (t) ; ( jH t ; m (t))) :
The …rst three conditions, given by (1)- (3) , are requirements of the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Inequalities (1) require the equilibrium strategy m to be sequentially optimal for the agent for any possible history H t and type realization . Similarly, inequalities (2) require equilibrium strategy e to be sequentially optimal for the principal. Equation ( 3) requires beliefs to be updated according to Bayes'rule. Finally, conditions (4)-(5) are requirements that the equilibrium strategies and the message space are Markov.
When we focus on the case = 0 in Section IV, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria, which are de…ned as follows. ( jH t ) is uniform over [0;^ ] for some^ 2 (0; 1), then for all 2 [0;^ ]: m ( ; X (t) ; ( jH t )) = m ^ ;^ X (t) ; ( jH 0 ) ; (6) e (X (t) ; ( jH t ; m (t))) = e ^ X (t) ; ( jH 0 ; m (t)) :
Condition (6) means that the message of type 2 [0;^ ] when the public state is X (t) and the posterior is uniform over [0;^ ] is the same as the message of type ^ when the public state is^ X (t) and the posterior is uniform over [0 ; 1] . Condition (7) means that the exercise strategy of the principal is the same when the public state is X (t) and her belief is that is uniform over [0;^ ] as when the public state is^ X (t) and her belief is that is uniform over [0; 1].
B. Proofs of lemmas and derivations of auxiliary results
Derivation of the optimal exercise policy for the call and put option. Let V (X) be the value of the option to a risk-neutral player if the current value of X (t) is X and the player perfectly knows . Because the player is risk-neutral, the expected return from holding the option over a small interval dt, E dV V , must equal the riskless return rdt. By Itô's lemma, dV (X (t)) = V 0 (X (t)) X (t) + 1 2 V 00 (X (t)) 2 X (t) 2 dt + V 0 (X (t)) dW (t) ;
and hence E dV (X (t)) V (X (t)) = rdt , 1 V (X (t)) V 0 (X (t)) X (t) + 1 2 V 00 (X (t)) 2 X (t) 2 dt = rdt;
which gives (8) rV = X @V @X
This is a second-order linear homogeneous ordinary di¤erential equation. The general solution to this equation is V (X) = D 1 X 1 +D 2 X 2 , where D 1 and D 2 are the constants to be determined, and 1 < 0 < 1 < 2 are the roots of 1 2 2 ( 1) + r = 0. We denote the negative root by and the positive root by . To …nd D 1 ; D 2 , we use two boundary conditions. If exercise of the option occurs at trigger X and gives a payo¤ p X , the …rst boundary condition is V X = p X .
For the call option, the second boundary condition is lim X!0 V (X) = 0 because zero is an absorbing barrier for the geometric Brownian motion. Hence, D 1 = 0. In addition, if is known to the principal, then p call X = X I. Hence, (9) V call X; X = X X X I :
Maximizing V call X; X with respect to X to derive the optimal call option exercise policy of the principal gives X = 1 I , i.e. (2) . It also follows that the value of the option to the principal if the current value of X (t) is X satis…es V P (X; ) = 8 < : X X P ( ) ( X P ( ) I) ; if X X P ( )
Similarly, for the put option, the second boundary condition is lim X!1 V (X) = 0, and hence D 2 = 0. Combining it with V X = p X and using p put X = I X, gives V put X; X = X X I X . Maximizing V put X; X with respect to X to derive the optimal put option exercise policy of the principal gives X = +1 I . We next prove two useful auxiliary results, which hold in any threshold-exercise PBEM. The …rst result shows that in any threshold-exercise PBEM, the option is exercised weakly later if the agent has less favorable information. The second auxiliary result is that it is without loss of generality to reduce the message space signi…cantly. Speci…cally, for any threshold-exercise equilibrium, there exists an equilibrium with a binary message space M = f0; 1g and simple equilibrium strategies that implements the same exercise times and hence features the same payo¤s of both players.
Lemma IA.1. X ( 1 ) X ( 2 ) for any 1 ; 2 2 such that 2 1 .
Lemma IA.2. If there exists a threshold-exercise PBEM with thresholds X ( ), then there exists an equivalent threshold-exercise PBEM with the binary message space M = f0; 1g and the following strategies of the agent and the principal and beliefs of the principal: 1. The agent with type sends message m (t) = 1 if and only if X (t) X ( ):
(10) m t ( ; X (t) ; ( jH t )) = ( 1; if X (t) X ( ) ; 0; otherwise.
2. The posterior belief of the principal at any time t is that is distributed uniformly over [ t ;^ t ] for some t and^ t (possibly, equal).
3. The exercise strategy of the principal as a function of the state process and her beliefs is (11) e t (X (t) ; t ;^ t ) = ( 1; if X (t) X( t ;^ t ); 0; otherwise, for some threshold X( t ;^ t ). Function X( t ;^ t ) is such that on equilibrium path the option is exercised at the …rst instant when the agent sends message m (t) = 1, i.e., when X (t) hits threshold X ( ) for the …rst time.
Proof of Lemma IA.1. By contradiction, suppose that X ( 1 ) < X ( 2 ) for some 2 > 1 .
Using the same arguments as in the derivation of (9) above but for I b instead of I, it is easy to see that if exercise occurs at a cuto¤ X and the current value of X (t) is X X, then the agent's expected payo¤ is given by X X X I + b . Hence, because the message strategy of type 1 is feasible for type 2 , the IC condition of type 2 implies:
Similarly, because the message strategy of type 2 is feasible for type 1 ,
These inequalities imply
which is a contradiction, because 2 > 1 and X( 1 )
Proof of Lemma IA.2. Consider a threshold exercise equilibrium E with an arbitrary message space M and equilibrium message strategy m , in which exercise occurs at stopping time ( ) = inf t 0jX (t) X ( ) for some set of thresholds X ( ), 2 . By Lemma IA.1, X ( ) is weakly decreasing. De…ne l (X) inf : X ( ) = X and h (X) sup : X ( ) = X for any X 2 X . We will construct a di¤erent equilibrium, denoted by E, which implements the same equilibrium exercise time ( ) and has the structure speci…ed in the formulation of the lemma. As we will see, it will imply that on the equilibrium path, the principal exercises the option at the …rst informative time t 2 T at which she receives message m (t) = 1, where the set T of informative times is de…ned as T t : X (t) = X for some X 2 X and X (s) < X 8s < t ;
i.e., the set of times when the process X (t) reaches one of the thresholds in X for the …rst time.
For the collection of strategies (10) and (11) and the corresponding beliefs to be an equilibrium, we need to verify the IC conditions of the agent and the principal.
1 -IC of the agent. The IC condition of the agent requires that any type is better o¤ sending a message m (t) = 1 when X (t) …rst reaches X ( ) than following any other strategy. By Assumption 1, a deviation to sending m (t) = 1 at any t = 2 T does not lead the principal to change her beliefs, and hence, her behavior. Thus, it is without loss of generality to only consider deviations at t 2 T . There are two possible deviations: sending m (t) = 1 before X (t) …rst reaches X ( ) and sending m (t) = 0 at that moment and following some other strategy after that. Consider the …rst deviation: the agent of type can send m (t) = 1 when X (t) hits threshold X(^ ),^ > h X ( ) for the …rst time, and then the principal will exercise immediately. Consider the second deviation: if type deviates to sending m (t) = 0 when X (t) hits threshold X ( ), he can then either send m (t) = 1 at one of the future t 2 T or continue sending the message m (t) = 0 at any future t 2 T . First, if the agent deviates to sending m (t) = 1 at one of the future t 2 T , the principal will exercise the option at one of the thresholdsŶ 2 X ,Ŷ > X ( ). Note that the agent can ensure exercise at any thresholdŶ 2 X such thatŶ X (t) by adopting the equilibrium message strategy of type^ at which X(^ ) =Ŷ . Second, if the agent deviates to sending m (t) = 0 at all of the future t 2 T , there are two cases. If X ( ) = 1, the principal will never exercise the option. If X ( ) = X max < 1, then the principal's belief when X (t) …rst reaches X max is that = , if X ( ) 6 = X ( ) 8 6 = , or that 2 ; h X max , otherwise. Upon receiving m (t) = 0 at this moment, the principal does not change her belief by Assumption 1 and hence exercises the option at X max = X ( ). Finally, note that the agent cannot induce exercise at Y 2 X ifŶ < X (t): in this case, the principal's belief is that the agent's type is smaller than the type that could induce exercise atŶ and this belief cannot be reversed according to Assumption 1. Combining all possible deviations, at time t, the agent can deviate to exercise at anyŶ 2 X as long asŶ X (t). Using the same arguments as in the derivation of (9) above but for I b instead of I, it is easy to see that the agent's expected utility given exercise at threshold X is X(t) X X I + b . Hence, the IC condition of the agent is that
Let us argue that it holds using the fact that E is an equilibrium. Suppose otherwise. Then, there exists a pair ( ;Ŷ ) withŶ 2 X such that
However, (15) implies that in equilibrium E type is better o¤ deviating from the message strategy m ( ) to the message strategy m ~ of type~ , where~ is any type satisfying X ~ =Ŷ (sincê Y 2 X , at least one such~ exists). This is impossible, and hence (14) holds. Hence, if the principal plays strategy (11), the agent …nds it optimal to play strategy (10). Given Lemma IA.1 and the fact that the agent plays (10), the posterior belief of the principal at any time t is that is distributed uniformly over [ t ;^ t ] for some t and^ t (possibly, equal). Next, consider the IC conditions of the principal. They are comprised of two parts, as evident from (11): we refer to the top line of (11) (exercising immediately when the principal "should" exercise) as the ex-post IC condition, and to the bottom line of (11) (not exercising when the principal "should" wait) as the ex-ante IC condition.
2 -"Ex-post" IC of the principal. First, consider the ex-post IC condition: we prove that the principal exercises immediately if the agent sends message m (t) = 1 at the …rst moment when X (t) hits thresholdŶ for someŶ 2 X (and sent message m (t) = 0 before). Given this message, the principal believes that s U ni[ l (Ŷ ); h (Ŷ )]. Because the principal expects the agent to play (10), the principal now expects the agent to send m (t) = 1 if X (t) Ŷ , and m (t) = 0 otherwise, regardless of 2 [ l (Ŷ ); h (Ŷ )]. Hence, the principal does not expect to learn any new information. This implies that the principal's problem is now equivalent to the standard option exercise problem with the option paying o¤ l (Ŷ )+ h (Ŷ ) 2 X (t) upon exercise at time t. Using the same arguments as in the derivation of (9) above, the principal's expected payo¤ from exercise at threshold X is X(t) X l (Ŷ )+ h (Ŷ ) 2 X I , which is an inverse U-shaped function with an unconditional maximum at
. Thus, the solution of the problem is to exercise the option immediately if and only if (16)
:
Let us show that any thresholdŶ 2 X and the corresponding type cuto¤s l (Ŷ ) and h (Ŷ ) in equilibrium E satisfy (16). Consider equilibrium E. For the principal to exercise at threshold X ( ), the value that the principal gets upon exercise must be greater or equal than what she gets from delaying the exercise. The value from immediate exercise equals E [ jH t ; m (t)] X ( ) I, where (H t ; m (t)) is any history of the sample path of X (t) and equilibrium messages that leads to exercise at time t at threshold X ( ) in equilibrium E. Because waiting until X (t) hits a threshold Y > X ( ) and exercising then is a feasible strategy, the value from delaying exercise is greater or
where we applied the law of iterated expectations and the conditional independence of the sample path of X (t) and the distribution of~ (conditional onỸ ,Ŷ , and~ < l (Ŷ ) ). Therefore, (18) cannot hold. Hence, the ex-ante IC condition of the principal is also satis…ed. Thus, if there exists a threshold exercise equilibrium E where ( ) = inf t 0jX (t) X ( ) for some threshold X ( ), then there exists a threshold exercise equilibrium E of the form speci…ed in the lemma, in which the option is exercised at the same time. Finally, let us show that on the equilibrium path, the option is indeed exercised at the …rst informative time t at which the principal receives message m (t) = 1. Because any message sent at t = 2 T does not lead to updating of the principal's beliefs and because of the second part of (11), the principal never exercises the option prior to the …rst informative time t 2 T at which she receives message m (t) = 1. Consider the …rst informative time t 2 T at which the principal receives m (t) = 1. By Bayes' rule, the principal believes that is distributed uniformly over ( l (X (t)) ; h (X (t))). Equilibrium strategy of the agent (10) implies X (t) = X ( ) 8 2 ( l (X (t)) ; h (X (t))). Therefore, in equilibrium the principal exercises the option immediately.
For Lemma 1, we prove the following lemma, which characterizes the structure of any incentivecompatible decision-making rule and is an analogue of Proposition 1 in Melumad and Shibano (1991) for the payo¤ speci…cation in our model:
3. An incentive-compatible threshold scheduleX ( ) must satisfy the following conditions:
1.X ( ) is weakly decreasing in .
2. IfX ( ) is strictly decreasing on ( 1 ; 2 ), thenX ( ) = 1 I b :
3. IfX ( ) is discontinuous at^ , then the discontinuity satis…eŝ ;^ ;
Proof of Lemma IA.3. Proof of Part 1. The …rst part of the lemma can be proven by contradiction. Suppose there exist 1 ; 2 2 , 2 > 1 , such thatX ( 2 ) >X ( 1 ). Note thatÛ A (X; ) X (0) X ( X I + b) andÛ P (X; ) X (0) X ( X I). The agent's IC constraint for = 1 and^ = 2 ,Û A X ( 1 ) ; 1 Û A X ( 2 ) ; 1 , can be written in the integral form:
or, equivalently,Û A (X( 1 ); 2 ) >Û A (X( 2 ); 2 ). However, this violates the agent's IC constraint U A (X( 2 ); 2 ) Û A (X( 1 ); 2 ) for = 2 and^ = 1 . Thus,X ( ) is weakly decreasing in .
Proof of Part 2. To prove the second part of the lemma, note thatÛ A X ; is di¤erentiable in for allX 2 (X (0) ; 1). BecauseÛ A (X; ) is linear in , it satis…es the Lipschitz condition and hence is absolutely continuous in for allX 2 (X (0) ; 1). Also, @Û A(X ; ) @ = X(0) X X , and hence supX 2X @Û A(X ; ) @ is integrable on 2 . By the generalized envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) , the equilibrium utility of the agent in any mechanism implementing exercise at thresholdsX( ), 2 , denoted V A ( ), satis…es the integral condition,
On the other hand, V A ( ) =Û A X ( ); . At any point at whichX( ) is strictly decreasing, we have
proves the second part of the lemma. Proof of Part 3. Finally, consider the third part of the lemma. Eq. (19) follows from (20), continuity ofÛ A ( ), and incentive compatibility of the mechanism. Otherwise, for example, ifÛ A X + (^ );^ >Û A X (^ );^ , thenÛ A X (^ ");^ " =Û A X (^ );^ " < U A X + (^ );^ " for a su¢ ciently small ", and hence types close enough to^ from below would bene…t from a deviation toX + (^ ), i.e., from mimicking types slightly above^ .
Next, we prove (20). First, note that, (20) is satis…ed at the boundaries. Indeed, denote 1
and suppose thatX( 1 ) 6 =X (^ ). Then, by the …rst part of the lemma,X( 1 ) >X (^ ).
BecauseX (^ ) lim "^ X ( ), there exists " > 0 such thatX( 1 ) >X(^ ") X (^ ). Because the functionÛ A (x; 1 ) has a maximum atX (^ ) and is strictly decreasing for x >X (^ ), this would implyÛ A (X( 1 ); 1 ) <Û A (X ^ " ; 1 ), and hence would contradict the IC condition for type 1 . The proof for the boundary 2
is similar.
We next prove (20) for interior values of . First, suppose thatX ( ) 6 =X (^ ) for some 2 ;^ . By part 1 of the lemma,X ( ) >X (^ ). By IC,Û A (X ( ) ; ) Û A (X (^ ); ), which can be written in the integral form as:
The function under the integral on the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in and the interval (X (^ );X ( )) is non-empty. Thus, we can replace by~ < under the integral and get a strict inequality:Û A (X ( ) ;~ ) >Û A (X (^ );~ ) for every~ 2 [ 1
; ). However, this contradictsX (^ ) = arg max xÛA (x; 1
). Second, suppose thatX ( ) 6 =X + (^ ) for
. By part 1 of the lemma,X ( ) <X + (^ ). By incentive compatibility,
Û A X + ( ) ; , which can be written as
The function under the integral on the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in and the interval (X ( ) ;X + (^ )) is non-empty. Therefore, we can replace by~ > under the integral and get a strict inequality,Û A X ( ) ;~ >Û A X + ( ) ;~ , for every~ 2 ; 1
.
Finally, (21) follows from the continuity ofÛ A ( ) and incentive compatibility ofX ( ). Becausê
), every policy with thresholds strictly belowX (^ ) or strictly abovê X + (^ ) is strictly dominated byX (^ ) andX + (^ ), respectively, and thus cannot be incentivecompatible. Suppose thatX(^ ) 2 X (^ );X + (^ ) . Incentive compatibility and (19) implŷ U A X (^ );^ Û A X (^ );^ =Û A X + (^ );^ . BecauseÛ A x;^ is strictly increasing in
x for x< 1 I b and strictly decreasing in x for x > 1 I b , the inequality must be strict:
U A X (^ );^ >Û A X (^ );^ =Û A X + (^ );^ . However, this together with (20) and continuity ofÛ A ( ) implies that types close enough to^ bene…t from a deviation to thresholdX(^ ). Hence, it must be thatX(^ ) 2
Proof of Lemma 1.
We show that for all parameter values, except the case b = I and = 0, there exists a unique optimal contract, and it takes the form speci…ed in the lemma. When b = I and = 0, the optimal contract is not unique, but the ‡at contract speci…ed in the lemma is optimal. To prove the lemma, we consider three cases: b I, b 2 [ I; I), and b < I. Denote the ‡at contract from the …rst part of the lemma byX f lat ( ), the contract from the second part byX ( ), and the contract from the third part byX + ( ).
Case 1: b I. In this case, all types of agents want to exercise the option immediately. This means that any incentive-compatible contract must be ‡at. Among ‡at contracts, the one that maximizes the payo¤ to the principal solves (23)
arg max
The proof for this case proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the optimal contract cannot have discontinuities, except the case b = I. Second, we show that the optimal continuous contract is as speci…ed in the lemma.
Step 1: If b > I, the optimal contract is continuous. Indeed, by contradiction, suppose that the optimal contract C = nX ( ) ; 2 o has a discontinuity at some point^ 2 ( ; 1). By Lemma IA.3, the discontinuity must satisfy (19)-(21). In particular, (20) implies that there exist 1 <^ and 2 >^ such thatX ( ) = X A ( 1 ) for 2
Because X ( X I + b) is maximized at X A ( ), the function ( )
~ 2 , and hence, by continuity of ( ), there exists~ 2 1 ;~ 2 such that ~ = 0, i.e., (24) is satis…ed. Intuitively, contract C 1 is the same as contract C, except that it substitutes a subset Because contract C is incentive-compatible and~ satis…es (24), contract C 1 is incentive-compatible too. Below we show that the payo¤ to the principal from contract C 1 exceeds the payo¤ to the principal from contract C for~ 2 very close to 2 . BecauseX 1 ( ) =X ( ) for 1 and 2 , it is enough to restrict attention to the payo¤ in the range 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). The payo¤ to the principal from contract C 1 in this range, divided by
The derivative of (25) with respect to~ 2 , after the application of (24) and Leibniz's integral rule, is (26)
Because X 0 A ( ) = X A ( ) , the …rst term of (26) can be simpli…ed to
. Using this and (24), the second term of (26) can be simpli…ed to
Adding (27) and (28), the derivative of the principal's payo¤ with respect to~ 2 is equal to
, which is strictly negative for any b > I. By the mean value theorem, if U P ~ 2 stands for the expected principal's utility from contract C, then
and hence a deviation from contract C to contract C 1 is bene…cial for the principal. Hence, contract C cannot be optimal for b > I.
Next, suppose b = I. In this case, the derivative of (25) with respect to~ 2 is zero for any~ 2 2 (^ ; 2 ]. It can be similarly shown that if, instead, we replace a subset
of the ‡at region [ 1 ; 2 ] with a continuous region whereX 1 ( ) = 1 I b , then the derivative of the principal's utility with respect to~ 1 is zero for any~ 1 2 [ 1 ;^ ). Combining the two arguments, contract C gives the principal the same expected utility as the contract where the ‡at region
is replaced by a continuous region withX 1 ( ) = 1 I b , and the rest of the contract is unchanged. Thus, if a discontinuous contract is optimal, then there exists an equivalent continuous contract, which contains a strictly decreasing region and which is also optimal.
Step 2: Optimal continuous contract. We prove that among continuous contracts satisfying Lemma IA.3, the one speci…ed in Lemma 1 maximizes the payo¤ to the principal. By Lemma IA.3 and continuity of the contract, it is su¢ cient to restrict attention to contracts that are combinations of, at most, one downward sloping partX ( ) = 1 I b and two ‡at parts: any contract that has at least two disjoint regions withX ( ) = 1 I b will exhibit discontinuity. Consider a contract such thatX ( ) is ‡at for
and is again ‡at for 2 [ 2 ; 1], for some 1 2 [0; 2 ] and 2 2 [ 1 ; 1]. This consideration allows for all possible cases, because it can be that 1 = and/or 2 = 1, or 1 = 2 ). The payo¤ to the principal, divided by
Since
First, suppose > 0. Then x = 1 takes values between 2 and 1. Since b 2 [ I; I), the function
Ix + I+b 2 is U-shaped and has two roots, 1 and I+b
. In particular, the maximum is achieved at
I. Finally, if b = I, then I+b I b = 0 and hence @P @ 1 > 0, i.e., (29) is increasing in 1 . Thus, (29) is also maximized at 1 = 2 .
Next, suppose = 0. Then @P @ 1 < 0 if I < b < I and @P @ 1 = 0, otherwise. Hence, for I < b < I and = 0, (29) is maximized at 1 = 0 = . If b = I and = 0, the principal's utility does not depend on 1 .
Next, the derivative of (29) with respect to 2 is
, and hence (30) is positive for any 2 2 [ ; 1). Therefore, (29) is maximized at 2 = 1. Combining this with the conclusions for 1 above, we get: 1a) For > 0: If b 2 [ 1 1+ I; 0], then 1 = I b I+b and 2 = 1, which together with continuity of the contract givesX ( ). If b 2 [ I; 1 1+ I], then 1 = 2 and 2 = 1, i.e., the optimal contract is ‡at. As shown above, among ‡at contracts, the one that maximizes the principal's payo¤ iŝ X f lat ( ). Note that this result implies that the optimal contract is unique among both continuous and discontinuous contracts even if b = I. Indeed, Step 1 shows that the principal's utility in any discontinuous contract is the same as in a continuous contract with a strictly decreasing region. Because the optimal contract among continuous contracts is unique and is strictly ‡at, the principal's utility in any discontinuous contract is strictly smaller than in the ‡at contract, which proves uniqueness.
1b) For = 0: If b 2 ( I; 0), then 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, i.e., the optimal contract is X A ( ) for all , consistent withX ( ). If b = I, then 2 = 1 and 1 2 [0; 1], i.e., multiple optimal contracts exist (including some discontinuous contracts, as shown before). The ‡at contract given byX f lat ( ) is one of the optimal contracts.
2) If b 2 [0; I), we have shown that 1 = for any 0, and hence we need to choose (29) is increasing in 2 up to I b I+b and decreasing after that. Hence, (29) is maximized at 2 = I b
I+b . Combined with 1 = and continuity of the contract, this giveŝ X + ( ).
Case 3: b < I. We show that the optimal contract is ‡at withX ( ) = 1 2I +1 . The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that the optimal contract cannot have any strictly decreasing regions and hence can only consist of ‡at regions. Second, we show that any contract with two ‡at regions is strictly dominated by a completely ‡at contract. Third, we show that any contract with at least three ‡at regions cannot be optimal. Combined, these steps imply that the optimal contract can only have one ‡at region, i.e., is completely ‡at. Combining this with (23) givesX f lat ( ) and completes the proof of this case.
Step 1: The optimal contract cannot have any strictly decreasing regions.
Consider a contract with a strictly decreasing region. According to Lemma IA.3, any strictly decreasing region is characterized byX ( ) = X A ( ) = 1 I b . Consider 1 and 2 such that
(such^ always exists and lies between^ 2 and^ 1 for the same reason as in contract C 1 ). Intuitively, contract C 2 is the same as contract C, except that it substitutes a subset h^ 2 ; 2 i of the decreasing region with a piecewise ‡at region with a discontinuity at^ . Because contract C is incentivecompatible and^ satis…es (31), contract C 2 is incentive-compatible too. Below we show that the payo¤ to the principal from contract C 2 exceeds the payo¤ to the principal from contract C for^ 2 very close to 2 . BecauseX 2 ( ) =X ( ) for 1 and 2 , it is enough to restrict attention to the payo¤ in the range 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). The payo¤ to the principal from contract C 2 in this range, divided by
Following the same arguments as for the derivative of (25) with respect to~ 2 above, we can check that the derivative of (32) with respect to^ 2 is given by
is strictly negative at any point^ 2 < 2 for b < I. By the mean value theorem, if U P (^ 2 ) stands for the expected principal's utility from contract C,
and hence a deviation from contract C to contract C 2 is bene…cial for the principal. Hence, contract C cannot be optimal for b < I. This result implies that any optimal contract must consist only of ‡at regions.
Step 2: Any contract with two ‡at regions is dominated by a contract with one ‡at region.
Consider a contract with two ‡at regions: Types h ;^ i pick exercise atX L , and types
Consider an alternative contract withX ( ) =X H for all . The di¤erence between the principal's value under this pooling contract and her value under the original contract, divided by X (0) , is given by
Using (33) and the fact that b I,
and the inequalities are strict if b < I. Combining this withX H <X L and using (34), implies that U 0 and U > 0 if at least one of b < I or > 0 holds. Thus, the contract with two ‡at regions is dominated by a contract with one ‡at region.
Step 3: Any contract with at least three ‡at regions cannot be optimal.
The proof of this step is similar to the proof of Step 3 in Proposition 4 in Melumad and Shibano (1991) for the payo¤ speci…cation in our model. Suppose, on the contrary, that the optimal contract X ( ) has at least three ‡at regions. Consider three adjacent steps, X L > X M > X H , of the assumed optimal contract. Types ^ 0 ;^ 1 pick exercise at X L , types ^ 1 ;^ 2 pick exercise at X M , and types
Incentive compatibility implies that types^ 1 and^ 2 satisfŷ
This contract is incentive-compatible. The di¤erence between the principal's value under this contract and the original contract, divided by X (0) 1 1 , is given by
Using the left equalities of (35) and (36), we can rewrite this as
Plugging in the values for y,^ 1 , and^ 2 from the right equalities of (35), (36), and (37), we get
Rearranging, we obtain
; which is strictly positive because
Thus, contract X ( ) is strictly dominated by contractX ( ) and hence cannot be optimal.
Supplementary analysis for the proof of Proposition 1. Proof that the principal' s ex-ante IC constraint is satis…ed. Let V c P X;^ ;^ denote the expected value to the principal in the equilibrium with continuous exercise (up to a cuto¤) if the current value of X (t) is X and the current belief is that 2 h ;^ i for some^ >^ . If the agent's type is >^ , exercise occurs at threshold 1 I b , and the principal's payo¤ upon exercise is 1 (I b) I. If <^ , exercise occurs at threshold X . Hence,
, the principal can either wait and get V c P X;^ ;^ or exercise immediately and get X +^ 
The function 1 X X +^ 2 I is inverse U-shaped in X and has an unconditional maximum at 1 2I +^ , which is strictly greater than X A (^ ) for any^ > I b I+b =^ . Because X V c P X;^ ;^ does not depend on X, (38) is equivalent to
Suppose there exists^ for which the ex-ante IC constraint is violated, i.e.,
We show that this implies that the contract derived in Lemma 1 cannot be optimal, which is a contradiction. In particular, denote the contract from the second part of Lemma 1 byX ( ). Then (39) implies that the contractX ( ) is dominated by the contract with continuous exercise at X A ( ) for ^ and exercise at X A (^ ) for ^ . Indeed, the principal's expected utility under the contractX ( ), divided by X (0) , is
Similarly, the principal's expected utility under the modi…ed contract (also divided by X (0) ), where I b I+b inX ( ) is replaced by^ , and the cuto¤ 1
Combining (40) and (41), it is easy to see that the contract with continuous exercise up to the cuto¤^ dominates the contractX ( ) if and only if (39) is satis…ed. Hence, the ex-ante IC constraint is indeed satis…ed.
Supplementary analysis for the proof of Proposition 2. Part 1. Derivation of the principal' s value function in the !-equilibrium, V P (X (t) ; 1; !). The principal's value function V P (X (t) ; 1; !) satis…es (42) rV P (X; 1; !) = XV P;X (X; 1; !)
The value matching condition is:
The intuition behind (43) is as follows. With probability 1 !, is above !. In this case, the agent recommends exercise, and the principal follows the recommendation. The payo¤ of the principal, given , is Y (!) I. With probability !, is below !, so the agent recommends against exercise, and the option is not exercised. The continuation payo¤ of the principal in this case is V P (Y (!) ; !; !). Solving (42) subject to (43), we obtain
By stationarity,
Evaluating (44) at X = !Y (!) and using the stationarity condition (45), we obtain:
Therefore,
Plugging (46) into (44), we obtain the principal's value function (A8). Part 2. Existence of !-equilibria for b < 0:
We have:
where the …rst limit holds by l'Hopital's rule. Denote the numerator of g 0 (!) by h (!) counted with their orders, does not exceed the number of sign changes of coe¢ cients of h (!), i.e., three. Because ! = 1 is the root of h (!) of order three and h (0) < 0, then h (!) < 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1), and hence g 0 (!) < 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1). Combined with lim !!1 g (!) = 0, this implies g (!) > 0 and hence G (!) > 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1). 2b. Proof of Step 1: If b < 0, V P (X; 1; !) is strictly increasing in ! for any ! 2 (0; 1).
Because V P (X; 1; !) is proportional to X , it is enough to prove the statement for X = 1. We can re-write V P (1; 1 
, a su¢ cient condition for V P (1; 1; !) to be increasing is that both f 1 (!) and f 2 (!) are increasing for ! 2 (0; ! ).
First, consider f 2 (!). As an auxiliary result, we prove that (1 + !) Y (!) is strictly decreasing in !. This follows from the fact that
and that as shown above, the numerator, h (!), is strictly negative for all ! 2 [0; 1). Next,
1+! for ! < 1 as shown above, and because (1 + !) Y (!) is strictly decreasing in !, f 0 2 (!) > 0 for any ! 2 (0; ! ). Second, consider f 1 (!). Note that
Denote the numerator of the second fraction by d (!) ( 1) ! +1 + ( + 1) ! ( + 1) ! + 1. By an extension of Descartes' Rule of Signs to generalized polynomials, the number of positive roots of d (!) does not exceed the number of sign changes of coe¢ cients of d (!), i.e., three. It is easy to show that d (1) = d 0 (1) = d 00 (1) = 0. Hence, ! = 1 is the root of d (!) = 0 of order three, and d (!) does not have roots other than ! = 1. Since d (0) = 1 > 0, this implies that for any ! 2 (0; 1), d (!) > 0. Hence, f 0 1 (!) > 0, which completes the proof of this step. 2c. Proof of Step 2: lim !!1 V P (X; 1; !) = V c P (X; 1). According to (47), V P (X; 1; !) = 2 X f 1 (!) f 2 (!). By l'Hopital's rule,
For ! close enough to zero, the ex-ante IC condition (A12) does not hold.
The function X 1 2 X I is inverse U-shaped and has a maximum at
Hence, we can rewrite (A12) as X V P (X; 1; !) X u 1 2 X u I , and it is easy to show that it is equivalent to
Since H (0) > 0, then as ! ! 0, the left-hand side of (48) converges to zero, while the right-hand side converges to (I b) > 0. Hence, for ! close enough to 0, the ex-ante IC condition is violated. 1 < 1 2I = X u , and hence there exists a unique ! such that Y (!) X u , ! !. Hence, (A12) becomes
On the other hand, according to Step 1, X V P (X; 1;!) X V P (X; 1; !) for any ! !. Hence, if (50) is satis…ed for! !, it is also satis…ed for any ! 2 [!; 1). Hence, to prove that (A12) is satis…ed for any ! !, it is su¢ cient to prove (50) for ! = !. Using (A8) and the fact that
By an extension of Descartes'Rule of Signs to generalized polynomials (Laguerre, 1883) , the number of positive roots of q (!), counted with their orders, does not exceed the number of sign changes of coe¢ cients of q (!), i.e., two. Since q (1) = q 0 (1) = 0, q (!) does not have any roots on (0; 1) other than 1. Since q 00 (1) > 0, we have q (!) > 0 for all ! 2 (0; 1), and hence Q 0 (!) < 0. By l'Hopital's rule, lim !!1 Q (!) = 1 , and hence 1 Q (!) for any ! 2 (0; 1), which proves (51).
We next show that if 0 < b < I, then in the range [0; 1], equation (52) has a unique solution ! 2 (0; 1), where ! decreases in b, lim b!0 ! = 1, and lim b!I ! = 0. We can rewrite (52) as
Denote the left-hand side of the second equation as a function of ! by l (!). The denominator of l (!), l d (!), is nonnegative on ! 2 [0; 1] and equals zero only at ! = 1. This follows from l d (0) = 2 I ( 1) (I b) > 0, l d (1) = 0, and l 0 d (!) = ( 1) ! 2 ( 2I + ! (I b)) < 0:Therefore, l (!) = 0 if and only if the numerator of l (!), l n (!), equals zero at ! 2 (0; 1). Since b 2 (0; I), then l n (0) = ( 1) (I b) < 0,
> 1, l 00 n (!) < 0 for any ! 2 [0; 1]. Since l 0 n (0) = 2 I ( 1) (I b) > 0 and l 0 n (1) = 2 ( 1) b < 0, there exists! 2 (0; 1) such that l n (!) increases to the left of! and decreases to the right. Since lim !!1 l n (!) = 0, then l n (!) > 0, and hence l n (!) has a unique root ! on (0; 1).
Since the function l n (!) increases in b and is strictly increasing at the point ! , then ! decreases in b. To prove that lim b!0 ! = 1, it is su¢ cient to prove that for any small " > 0, there exists b (") > 0 such that l n (1 ") < 0 for b < b ("). Since l n (!) > 0 on (! ; 1), this would imply that ! 2 (1 "; 1), i.e., that ! is in…nitely close to 1 when b is close to zero. Using the expression for l n (!), l n (!) < 0 is equivalent to
Denote the left-hand side of (53) by L (!). Note that L (!) is increasing on (0; 1). Indeed, di¤erentiating L (!) and simplifying,
where ' 0 (!) > 0 and '(1) = 0. Since (!) is decreasing and (1) = 0, then, indeed, (!) > 0 and hence L 0 (!) > 0 for all ! 2 (0; 1). In addition, by l'Hopital's rule, lim !!1 L (!) = 1. Hence, L (1 ") < 1 for any " > 0, and thus l n (1 ") < 0 for b 2 [0; I (1 L (1 "))).
Finally, to prove that lim b!I ! = 0, it is su¢ cient to prove that for any small " > 0, there exists b (") such that l n (") > 0 for b > b ("). Since l n (0) < 0, this would imply that ! 2 (0; ") for b > b ("), i.e., that ! is in…nitely close to zero when b is close to I. Based on (53), l n (!) > 0 , L (!) > 1 b I . Then, for any " > 0, if b > I (1 L (")), we get 1 b I < L (") , l n (") > 0, which completes the proof. 3b. Proof that Y (!) is strictly decreasing in ! for ! 2 (0; 1). Note that
According to an extension of Descartes'Rule of Signs to generalized polynomials (Laguerre, 1883), the number of positive roots of k (!) = 0, counted with their orders, does not exceed the number of change of signs of its coe¢ cients, i.e., two. Since k (1) = 0, k 0 (1) = 0, and k" (1) = ( 1) < 0, ! = 1 is a root of order two, and there are no other positive roots. Further, k (0) = 0 and k 0 (0) = 1 < 0. It follows that k (0) = k (1) = 0 and k (!) < 0 for all ! 2 (0; 1), and hence, indeed, @Y (!) @! < 0. 3c. Proof of Step 5: If b > 0, V P (X; 1; !) is strictly increasing in ! for any ! 2 (0; ! ).
The proof of this step is the same as the proof of Step 1 for the case b < 0 with the only di¤erence: instead of relying on the inequality Y (!) > 1 2I 1+! for all ! 2 (0; 1) as for the case b < 0 (which holds for b < 0), we rely on the inequality Y (!) > 1 2I 1+! for all ! 2 (0; ! ). 3d. Proof of Step 6: If 0 < b < I, then the ex-ante IC condition (A12) holds as a strict inequality for ! = ! .
Using (A8) and Y (!) = 1 2I 1+! , we can rewrite V P (X; 1; ! ) as X K (! ), where
Note that K (0) = X u 1 2 X u I and that
By an extension of Descartes'Rule of Signs to generalized polynomials, the number of positive roots of (!), counted with their orders, does not exceed the number of change of signs of its coe¢ cients, i.e., three. Note that ! = 1 is the root of (!) of order three: (1) = 0 (1) = 00 (1) = 0, and hence there are no other roots. Since (0) = 1 > 0, it follows that (!) > 0 and hence K 0 (!) > 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1). Therefore, K (!) is strictly increasing in !, which implies (54) X V P (X; 1; ! ) = K (! ) > K (0) = X u 1 2 X u I :
Because the function X 1 2 X I achieves its global maximum at the point X u , (54) implies that (A12) holds as a strict inequality for ! = ! , which completes the proof of this step. Figure B .1 illustrates the equilibria with partitioned exercise characterized in Proposition 2. We next compare the equilibria in Proposition 2 in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency and derive some comparative statics results.
Proposition B.1. If b < 0, the equilibrium with continuous exercise from Proposition 2 dominates all other possible equilibria in the Pareto sense: both the agent's expected payo¤ for each realization of and the principal's expected payo¤ are higher in this equilibrium than in any other equilibrium. If b > 0, the ! -equilibrium dominates other stationary equilibria with partitioned exercise in the following sense: both the principal's expected payo¤ and the ex-ante expected payo¤ of the agent before is realized are higher in the ! -equilibrium than in the !-equilibrium for any ! < ! .
Intuitively, when b < 0, the equilibrium with continuous exercise both implements the optimal mechanism for the principal and ensures that exercise occurs at the unconstrained optimal time of any type of the agent. When b > 0, the ! -equilibrium is the only equilibrium in which exercise is unbiased: since the principal's ex-post IC condition holds as an equality, the exercise rule maximizes the principal's payo¤ given that the agent's type lies in a given partition. In all other equilibria, there is both loss of information and delay in option exercise, which is detrimental for both the principal and the agent with a bias towards early exercise. Interestingly, delay in exercise in these equilibria occurs despite the fact that the agent is biased towards early exercise. Proof of Proposition B.1. 1. Proof for b < 0. In the equilibrium with continuous exercise, exercise occurs at the unconstrained optimal time of any type of the agent. Therefore, the payo¤ of any type of the agent is higher in this equilibrium than in any other possible equilibrium. In addition, as Proposition 1 shows, the exercise times implied by the optimal mechanism if the principal could commit to any mechanism, coincide with the exercise times in the equilibrium with continuous exercise. Thus, the principal's expected payo¤ in this equilibrium exceeds her expected payo¤ under the exercise rule implied by any other equilibrium. 2. Proof for b > 0. The expected utility of the principal in the !-equilibrium is V P (X; 1; !), given by (A8). As shown in Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2, V P (X; 1; !) is strictly increasing in ! for ! 2 (0; ! ). Hence, V P (X; 1; ! ) > V P (X; 1; !) for any ! < ! . Denote the ex-ante expected utility of the agent (before the agent's type is realized) by V A (X; 1; !). Repeating the derivation of the principal's value function V P (X; 1; !) in the Online Appendix, it is easy to see that
The only di¤erence of this expression from the expression for V P (X; 1; !) given by (A8) is that I in the second bracket of (A8) is replaced by (I b). To prove that V A (X; 1; ! ) > V A (X; 1; !) for any ! < ! , we prove that V A (X; 1; !) is strictly increasing in ! for ! 2 (0; ! ). The proof repeats the arguments behind Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 2. In particular, we can re-write
As shown in Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 2, f 1 (!) > 0 and f 0 1 (!) > 0. In addition,
1+! for any ! < ! , andf 0 2 (!) > 0 for the same reasons why f 0 2 (!) > 0 in Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 2. Hence, V A (X; 1; !) is increasing in ! 2 (0; ! ).
Focusing on the most informative (! ) equilibrium in the early exercise bias case, the informativeness of communication exhibits interesting comparative statics.
Proposition B.2. Consider the case of an agent biased towards early exercise, b > 0. Then, ! decreases in b and increases in , and hence decreases in and , and increases in r.
The result that ! decreases in the agent's bias is in line with the result of Crawford and Sobel (1982) that less information is revealed if the misalignment of preferences is bigger. More interesting are the comparative statics results in , , and r. The proposition shows that communication is less e¢ cient when the option to wait is more valuable. For example, there is less information revelation (! is lower) if the environment is more uncertain ( is higher). Intuitively, higher uncertainty increases the value of the option to delay exercise and thus e¤ectively increases the con ‡ict of interest between the principal and the agent biased towards early exercise. Similarly, communication is less e¢ cient in lower interest rate and higher growth rate environments.
Proof of Proposition B.2. The fact that ! decreases in b has been proved in the supplementary analysis for the proof of Proposition 2 in the Online Appendix. We next show that ! increases in . From
I b > 0, and ! is the unique solution of F (!; ) = 0 in (0; 1), we know that F ! (! ( ) ; ) > 0. As we prove below, F (!; ) < 0. Hence, ! is strictly increasing in > 1. Finally, a standard calculation shows that @ @ < 0, @ @ < 0, and @ @r > 0. Thus, ! decreases in and and increases in r.
Proof that F (!; ) < 0. Di¤erentiating F (!; ) with respect to and reorganizing the terms, we obtain that F (!; ) < 0 is equivalent to
Denote the left-hand side as a function of by N ( ). Because N (1) = 0, a su¢ cient condition for N ( ) > 0 for any > 1 is that N 0 ( ) > 0 for > 1. Di¤erentiating N ( ):
Because ln ! < 0 for any ! 2 (0; 1), condition N 0 ( ) > 0 is equivalent to n ( ) ! 1 ! 1 ! 2 +1 > 0. Note that lim !1 n ( ) = 0 and n 0 ( ) =
The second term of (55) is positive, because 1 ! 2x 1 1 > 0, since 1 ! > 1 and 2x 1 > 1 for any x > 1. The …rst term of (55) is positive, because
where the …rst row is by l'Hopital's rule, and the second row is because
> 0 and 2 ln ! 1 ! + ! equals zero at ! = 1. Thus, ( ) > 0 and hence n 0 ( ) > 0 for any > 1, which together with n (1) = 0 implies n ( ) > 0, which in turn implies that N ( ) > 0 for any > 1. Hence, F (!; ) < 0. i has at least one solution. By part (ii) of Assumption 2, the solution is unique and L > . In fact, as the proof below shows, part 1 of Proposition 4 is satis…ed even if part (ii) of Assumption 2 is not satis…ed and we de…ne L as the lowest solution to I I b = E h~ j~ i . Proof of Part 1. We show that if part (i) of Assumption 2 is satis…ed and L is de…ned as the lowest solution to I I b = E h~ j~ i , then our problem satis…es the conditions of Proposition 1 in Amador and Bagwell (2013), once we introduce a change in process from X (t) to P (X (t)) X (t) +1 . Since > 1, P (X) is strictly decreasing in X with lim X!0 P (X) = 1 and lim X!1 P (X) = 0. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between X and P , so any threshold-exercise direct mechanism nX ( ) ; 2 o with upper thresholds on process X (t)
Proof of
can be equivalently written as a threshold-exercise direct mechanism nP ( ) ; 2 o with lower thresholds on process P (X (t)), withP ( ) =X ( ) +1 . The payo¤s of the principal and the agent,Ũ P P ; andŨ A P ; , divided by X (0) , can be written as:
Thus, the optimal mechanism problem (similar to (4)-(5), but for a general distribution) is a special case of the problem in Amador and Bagwell (2013) without money burning, where = , =P , ! ;P =Ũ P P ; , and b P = (I b)P 1 . It is easy to check that the conditions of Assumption 1 in their paper hold for any b < I. By analogy with Amador and Bagwell (2013), de…ne as
We next verify that the conditions of Proposition 1 in Amador and Bagwell (2013) hold for these functions. Since X A ( ) = 1 I b , the optimal agent's threshold in terms of P (t) is P A ( ) = Condition (c1). Since @Ũ P (P A ( ); ) 
Proof of Part 2. To prove this part, we impose part (ii) of Assumption 2. Given that the principal plays the strategy stated in the proposition, the strategy of any type of the agent is incentive-compatible. Indeed, for any type L , exercise occurs at his most preferred time, so no type L bene…ts from a deviation. Any type < L does not bene…t from a deviation either because the agent would lose from inducing the principal to exercise earlier, and inducing exercise later than threshold X A ( L ) is not feasible given that the principal never exercises later than X A ( L ) under her strategy. Next, let us verify the optimality of the principal's strategy. We need to check that the principal has incentives to exercise the option immediately when the agent sends message m = 1 (the ex-post IC constraint), and not to exercise the option before getting message m = 1 (the ex-ante IC constraint). The ex-post IC constraint follows from the fact that the principal learns the agent's type if the agent sends message m = 1 at …rst-passage time of any threshold between X A and X A ( L ), and realizes that it is already too late to exercise (X P ( ) < X A ( )), and thus does not bene…t from delaying exercise even further. If the agent sends a message to exercise when X (t) hits X A ( L ) = 1 I b L , the principal infers that L and that she will not learn any additional information by waiting more. Given the belief that 2 [ ; L ], the optimal exercise threshold for the principal is given by
L by the de…nition of L . Hence, the ex-post IC constraint is satis…ed. Finally, consider the ex-ante IC constraint. Proof that the principal' s ex-ante IC constraint is satis…ed. LetṼ p X;^ ; L be the expected value to the principal from following the strategy of waiting for the agent's recommendation m = 1 until X (t) hits X A ( L ) for the …rst time and exercising at threshold X A ( L ) regardless of the agent's recommendation, where X is the current value of X (t) and the principal believes that is distributed over
Because the principal's belief is that 2
Hence, the ex-ante IC constraint requiresṼ p X;^ ; L XE h j ^ i I for any^ > L and X X A ^ , or, equivalently,
The right-hand side of (56) is an inverted U-shaped function that reaches its maximum at X max ^ , and hence the right-hand side of (56) is strictly increasing in X over X X A ^ . Hence, the ex-ante IC constraint (56) is satis…ed for any X X A ^ if and only if it is satis…ed at X = X A ^ . Finally, suppose that (56) is violated at X = X A ^ for somê > L . However, this implies that threshold scheduleX ( )
, which contradicts part 1 of the proposition. Indeed, violation of (56) means (57)
The principal's expected utility under the optimal contract in Part 1 of the proposition, divided by X (0) , is
Consider a modi…ed contract with L replaced by^ . The principal's expected utility under this modi…ed contract, divided by X (0) , is
Rearranging the terms, it is straightforward to see that (58)<(59) is equivalent to (57). Hence, (57) implies that the contract in Part 1 of the proposition is dominated by another interval delegation contract, which is a contradiction. Thus, the ex-ante IC constraint is indeed satis…ed, which completes the proof of Part 2. Proof of Part 3. Similarly to the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, if b > 0, there is no equilibrium that features separation of types over some interval. Hence, the mechanism from part 1, which features separation, cannot be implemented in any equilibrium.
The next lemma describes the distributions that satisfy and do not satisfy Assumption 2.
Lemma IA.4. Suppose that I < b < 0 and 0 < < .
1.
If is uniformly distributed on ; , Assumption 2 is satis…ed.
2. If is distributed according to a truncated standard normal distribution on ; , Assumption 2 is satis…ed.
3. Suppose is distributed according to a power distribution with parameter on ; , i.e., ( ) = ( ) . Then, Assumption 2 is satis…ed if and only if 1.
Proof of Lemma IA.4. To prove that ( ) + b I ( ) is non-decreasing in , it is necessary and su¢ cient to check that ,
which has at most one solution because > 0. Proof of Part 2. Denote f and F the probability density function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal distribution N (0; 1). Denote the cdf of the standard normal distribution truncated on [a; b] by F a;b and the pdf by f a;b . Then, according to the properties of normal distribution,
and the conditional expectation is
Hence, (60) is satis…ed because
Thus, part (i) of Assumption 2 is satis…ed. Next, using (61),
The function on the right-hand side is increasing and the function on the left-hand side is decreasing because f ( ) decreases and F ( ) increases on > 0. Hence, this equation can have at most one solution,which proves part (ii) of Assumption 2. Proof of Part 3. We …rst show that part (ii) of Assumption 2 is satis…ed for any a. Since ( ) = ( ) 1 , we have
Hence,
,
which has at most one solution because > 0. Next, consider part (i) of Assumption 2:
which increases in if and only if Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a problem in which the agent is free to choose whether to exercise the option prior to the arrival of the news, while the principal makes the exercise decision after the arrival of the news. Let V a A (X; ) be the value of the option to the agent of type after the arrival of the news: if X X P ( ) :
Let V b A (X; ) be the value of the option to the agent before the arrival of the news. Since the expected return from holding an option over a small interval [t; t + dt] must be rdt, V b A (X; ) satis…es
First, we show that waiting is optimal in the range X X P ( ). Since the agent can follow the strategy of exercising the option at threshold X P ( ), it must be that V b A (X; ) X X P ( ) ( X P ( ) I + b). By contradiction, suppose that there exists pointX < X P ( ) at which it is optimal for the agent to exercise the option. It follows that because V b A (X; )
which is a contradiction since the right-hand side is strictly increasing inX 2 (0; X P ( )). Thus, the exercise threshold is in the range X X P ( ). Eq. (62) must be solved subject to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we obtain 
where + > 1 and < 0 are the roots of 1 2 2 ( 1) + r = 0, constants A 1 , A 2 , and B are given by
and the optimal exercise thresholdX A ( ) satis…es
The left-hand side is strictly increasing inX A ( ). Let us see that the right-hand side is strictly decreasing inX A ( ). Since < 0 and b < 0, it is su¢ cient to show that 
Hence, the right-hand side of (63) is strictly decreasing inX A ( ). Therefore, there exists a uniqueX A ( ) that solves (63). To show thatX A ( ) < X A ( ), suppose by contradiction thatX A ( ) > X A ( ). 18 Since waiting is optimal in X <X
which is a contradiction with V A (X; ) being the highest possible value function to the agent across all exercise policies. Thus,X A ( ) < X A ( ).
Next, we show that the strategy pro…le stated in the proposition constitutes an equilibrium in the communication game, whereX A ( ) is de…ned by (63). The IC condition for the agent with :X A ( ) X is satis…ed, since it leads to the option being exercised at thresholdX A ( ), which is the optimal strategy for the agent in the constrained delegation problem, as shown above. The IC condition for the agent with :X A ( ) > X is satis…ed, since threshold X is the highest threshold at which the agent can get the option to be exercised, given the strategy of the principal, and X dominates any threshold below it by monotonicity of the agent's payo¤.
Finally, it remains to derive threshold X, at which it is optimal for the principal to exercise without waiting for the agent's recommendation. Let V b P (X; ; Y ) denote the value function to the principal prior to the arrival of the news, conditional on the type of the agent being and conditional on the option being exercised at threshold Y X prior to the arrival of the news.
is the value of the option to the principal after the arrival of the news. Eq. (64) is solved subject to the value-matching conditionṼ b P (Y ; ; Y ) = Y I. Let V b P X;^ ; X be the principal's value function prior to the arrival of the news, given current state X, posterior belief that is uniform over
, if the principal waits for the agent's recommendation to exercise until threshold X:
Di¤erentiating with respect to X, we obtain the …rst-order condition that determines X:
(66)
C. Centralized decision-making vs. delegation
In this section, we explore the implications of the results for the optimal allocation of authority. In particular, we compare centralized decision-making, where the principal keeps formal authority and plays the communication game analyzed in Sections III and IV, to delegation, where the principal delegates formal authority to exercise the option to the agent. We …rst analyze simple, once-and-for-all, delegation, where the principal delegates authority from the beginning and never takes it back. Next, we consider the problem where the delegation policy can be time-contingent.
C.1 Once-and-for-all delegation
First, consider the case of the late exercise bias. Because centralized decision-making implements the optimal commitment mechanism when b < 0, the principal is always weaker better o¤ retaining control and getting advice from the agent rather than delegating the exercise decision. Moreover, while delegation and communication are equivalent if = 0, delegation is strictly inferior to communication if > 0: Not delegating the decision and playing the communication game implements constrained delegation (delegation up to a cuto¤), while delegation implements unconstrained delegation. This result is illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary to Proposition 1. If b < 0, the principal always weakly prefers retaining control and getting advice from the agent to delegating the exercise decision. The preference is strict if > 0. If = 0, retaining control and delegation are equivalent.
This result contrasts with the implications for static decisions, such as choosing the scale of the project. Dessein (2002) shows that in the leading quadratic-uniform setting of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , regardless of the direction of the agent's bias, delegation always dominates communication as long as the agent's bias is not too high so that at least some informative communication is possible. For general payo¤ functions, Dessein (2002) shows that delegation is optimal if the agent's bias is su¢ ciently small. In contrast, we show that if the agent favors late exercise, then regardless of the magnitude of his bias, the principal never wants to delegate decision-making authority once-and-for-all. Intuitively, the inability to go back in time allows the principal to commit to follow the recommendations of the agent and ensures that communication is su¢ ciently e¤ective so that delegation has no further bene…t.
Next, consider the case of the early exercise bias. Because the optimal commitment mechanism in Lemma 1 features constrained delegation, simple delegation does not implement the optimal mechanism. However, di¤erently from the case of a late exercise bias, simple delegation can be preferred to centralization if the agent's bias is low enough. The following proposition summarizes our …ndings. The result that delegation is bene…cial when the agent's bias is small enough is similar to the result of Dessein (2002) for static decisions. This similarity to the static setting is expected, given that the ! -equilibrium of the dynamic communication game also exists in the static communication game (see Proposition 3). Intuitively, the principal faces a trade-o¤: delegation leads to early exercise due to the agent's bias but uses the agent's information more e¢ ciently. When the agent's bias is small enough, the cost from early exercise is smaller than the cost due to the loss of the agent's information, and hence delegation dominates.
C.2 Time-contingent delegation
In a dynamic setting, delegation does not need to be once-and-for-all but can instead be time-contingent: the principal may retain authority for some period of time and delegate it later, or she may take authority back from the agent. In this section, we show that there always exists a time-contingent delegation policy that implements the optimal mechanism.
We …rst focus on the case of an early exercise bias. Consider the following game: The principal and the agent play the communication game of Section III, but at any time, the principal may delegate decision-making authority to the agent. After authority is granted, the agent retains it until the end of the game and thus is free to choose when to exercise the option. The next result shows that for any 0, the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by delegating the decision at the right time.
Proposition C.2. If b > 0, there exists the following equilibrium. The principal delegates authority to the agent at the …rst moment when X (t) reaches the threshold X d min( (I+b) 1 ; 1 2I +1 ) and does not exercise the option before that. For any , the agent sends message m = 0 at any point before he is given authority. If
I b
I+b , the agent exercises the option immediately after he is given authority, and if I b I+b , the agent exercises the option when X (t) …rst reaches his preferred exercise threshold X A ( ) = 1 I b . The exercise threshold in this equilibrium coincides with the optimal exercise threshold under commitment.
Intuitively, timing delegation strategically ensures that the information of low types (
I+b ) is used e¢ ciently, and that all types above I b I+b exercise immediately at the time of delegation, exactly as in the optimal contract. The higher is the agent's bias, the later will delegation occur.
It can be similarly shown that when the agent favors late exercise, b < 0, the optimal mechanism from Lemma 1 is implemented by the following delegation policy. The principal delegates authority to the agent at the beginning, but then takes authority away and exercises the option at the …rst moment when X (t) reaches the threshold max( 1 I+b ; 1 2I +1 ). This time-contingent delegation policy is therefore equivalent to centralized decision-making with communication.
Overall, the analysis in this section implies that in the context of timing decisions, the direction of the con ‡ict of interest is the key driver of whether delegating authority adds value. If the agent favors late exercise, delegation, whether time-contingent or once-andfor-all, adds no additional value over centralized decision-making. In contrast, if the agent favors early exercise, once-and-for-all delegation when the agent's bias is small enough, as well as time-contingent delegation, are superior to centralized decision-making.
Proof of Proposition C.1. Let V D (X; b) denote the expected value to the principal under delegation if the current value of X (t) is X. If the decision is delegated to the agent, exercise occurs at threshold X A ( ) = 1 I b , and the principal's payo¤ upon exercise is
Let V A (X; b) denote the expected value to the principal in the most informative equilibrium of the communication game if the current value of X (t) is X. Using (A8) and
!+1 , given b. Because X enters as a multiplicative factor in both V D(X; b) and V A( 
Thus, delegation dominates communication if the agent favors early exercise but the bias is low enough.
. In particular, it follows that lim b!0+ V D 0 (b) = 0 and lim b!0
The derivative of V A (b) with respect to b can be found as
Recall that ! (b) solves (52), which is equivalent to
Di¤erentiating this equation, we get 2I (I b) 2 1 db (69)
1 ! 1 , we can rewrite the left-hand side of (69) as
Substituting this into (69) and simplifying, we get
Plugging (70) and
into (67), we get
, we express 1 b from (68) as
and hence
By l'Hopital's rule, the …rst limit equals ( +1 ) 2 , and the second limit equals 1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition C.2.
Note that the following three inequalities are equivalent: b : We prove that neither the agent nor the principal wants to deviate from the speci…ed strategies. First, consider the agent. Given Assumption 1, sending a message m = 1 is never bene…cial because it does not change the principal's belief and hence her strategy. Hence, the agent cannot induce exercise before he is given authority. After the agent is given authority, his optimal strategy is to: 
I+b , this strategy again coincides with the equilibrium strategy. Hence, the agent does not want to deviate.
Next, consider the principal. The above arguments show that the equilibrium exercise times coincide with the exercise times under the optimal mechanism in Lemma 1 for all b. Hence, the principal's expected utility in this equilibrium equals her expected utility in the optimal mechanism. Consider possible deviations of the principal, taking into account that the agent's messages are uninformative and hence the principal does not learn new information by waiting. First, the principal can exercise the option himself, before or after X (t) …rst reaches X d . Because a mechanism with such an exercise policy is incentive-compatible, the principal's utility from such a deviation cannot exceed her utility under the optimal mechanism and hence her equilibrium utility. Thus, such a deviation cannot be strictly pro…table. Second, the principal can deviate by delegating authority to the agent before or after X (t) …rst reaches X d . An agent who receives authority at some point t will exercise immediately if b I, or if b < I and X (t) X A ( ), and will exercise when X (t) …rst reaches X A ( ) otherwise. Because a mechanism with such an exercise schedule is incentive-compatible, the principal's utility from this deviation cannot exceed her utility under the optimal mechanism and hence her equilibrium utility. Hence, the principal does not want to deviate either.
D. Robustness
In this section, we show the robustness of the results to several versions of the model.
D.1 Simple compensation contracts
A reasonable question is whether simple compensation contracts, such as paying a …xed amount for exercise (if b < 0) or for the lack of exercise (if b > 0), can solve the problem and thus make the analysis less relevant. We show that this is not the case. Speci…cally, we allow the principal to o¤er the agent the following payment scheme. If the agent is biased towards late exercise (b < 0), the principal can promise the agent a lump-sum payment z that he will receive as soon as the option is exercised. A higher payment decreases the con ‡ict of interest and speeds up option exercise. For example, if z = b 2 , the agent's and the principal's interests are aligned because each of them receives X I + b 2 upon exercise. However, a higher payment is also more expensive for the principal. Because of that, as the next result shows, it is always optimal for the principal to o¤er z < b 2 , and hence the con ‡ict of interest will remain. Moreover, if the agent's bias is su¢ ciently small, the optimal payment is in fact zero.
Similarly, if the agent is biased towards early exercise (b > 0), the principal can promise the agent a ‡ow of paymentsẑdt up to the moment when the option is exercised. Higherẑ aligns the interests of the players but is expensive for the principal. The next result shows that if the initial value of the state process is su¢ ciently small, the optimalẑ is again zero. In numerical analysis, we also show that similarly to the late exercise bias case, the optimal payment is smaller than the payment that would eliminate the con ‡ict of interest.
Proposition D.1. Suppose b < 0 and the principal can promise the agent a payment z 0 upon exercise. Then the optimal z is always strictly smaller than b 2 and equals zero if b > I 1 . Suppose b > 0 and the principal can promise the agent a ‡ow of paymentŝ zdt 0 up to the moment of option exercise. Then the optimalẑ equals zero if X (0) is su¢ ciently small.
Thus, allowing simple compensation contracts often does not change the problem at all, and at most leads to an identical problem with a di¤erent bias b. We conclude that
D.2 Model with di¤erent discount rates
In our basic setup, the con ‡ict of interest between the agent and the principal is modeled by the agent's bias b. Our results are similar in an alternative setup, where the con ‡ict of interest arises because the agent and the principal have di¤erent discount rates. This section presents the summary of this analysis, and the full analysis is available from the authors upon request.
Suppose that the agent's discount rate is r A , the principal's discount rate is r P , and both players'payo¤ from exercise at time t is X (t) I. Similar to the basic model, we can de…ne A and P , where i is the positive root of the quadratic equation 1 2 2 i ( i 1)+ i r i = 0.
The case where the principal is more impatient than the agent (r P > r A , or equivalently, P > A ) is similar to the case b < 0 in the basic model. We show that if = 0, then as long as A > 2 P 1+ P , there exists an equilibrium with continuous exercise in which exercise occurs at the agent's most preferred threshold A A 1 I . If > 0, the equilibrium features continuous exercise up to a cuto¤. The case where the agent is more impatient than the principal (r P < r A ) is similar to the case b > 0 in the basic model. We show that the equilibrium with continuous exercise does not exist and derive the analog of Proposition 2. Speci…cally, in the most informative stationary equilibrium, exercise is unbiased given the principal's information. This equilibrium is characterized by! < 1, which is the unique solution of 1 ! A I ! (1 ! A 1 ) = P P 1 2I ! + 1 :
In addition, for any ! 2 [!;! ), where 0 <! <! , there is a unique !-equilibrium where exercise happens with delay.
D.3 Put option
So far, we have assumed that the decision problem is over the timing of exercise of a call option, such as the decision of when to invest. In this section, we show that if the decision problem is over the timing of exercise of a put option, such as the decision of when to liquidate a project, the analysis and economic insights are similar. The nature of the option, call or put, is irrelevant for the results. What matters is the asymmetric nature of time: Time moves forward and thereby creates a one-sided commitment device for the principal to follow the agent's recommendations.
Consider the model of Section I with the following change. The exercise of the option leads to the payo¤s I X (t) and (I + b) X (t) for the principal and the agent, respect-ively. As before, is a random draw from a uniform distribution on [ ; 1] and is privately learned by the agent at the initial date. If = 0, the model exhibits stationarity. For example, if the decision represents shutting down a project, I corresponds to the salvage value of the project, b represents the agent's private cost (if b < 0) or bene…t (if b > 0) of liquidating the project, and X (t) corresponds to the present value of the cash ‡ows from keeping the project a ‡oat. The solution of this model follows the same structure as the solution of the model with the call option. We summarize our …ndings below, and the full analysis is available from the authors upon request.
Suppose that we start with a high enough X (0), so that immediate exercise does not happen. At the beginning of Online Appendix B, we show that if were known, the optimal exercise policy of each player would be given by a lower trigger on X (t): X P ( ) = +1 I , X A ( ) = +1 (b + I) , where is the negative root of the quadratic equation that de…ned . If b > 0, then X A ( ) > X P ( ), i.e., the agent's preferred exercise policy is to exercise earlier than the principal. Similarly, if b < 0, the agent is biased towards late exercise.
Suppose that = 0 and consider the communication game like the one in Section III. If b 2 ( I 2 ; 0), there is an equilibrium with full information revelation: The agent recommends waiting as long as X (t) exceeds his preferred exercise threshold X A ( ) and recommends exercising at the …rst moment when X (t) hits X A ( ). Upon getting the recommendation to exercise, the principal realizes it is too late and …nds it optimal to exercise immediately. Prior to that, the principal prefers to wait because the value of learning exceeds the cost of delay. If b > 0, this equilibrium does not exist, and all stationary equilibria are of the form f(!; 1); (! 2 ; !); :::g, where type 2 (! n ; ! n 1 ) recommends exercise at threshold ! n 1 Y put (!), where Y put (!) = ! ! +1 1 ! +1 (I + b) :
